Key Leaked: find every copy of a leaked key and revoke it

1. Before deploy: a Vite app leaking keys through its build

A Vite single-page app. The dist/ folder is committed and source maps are on. The chat feature calls Anthropic straight from the browser. A gitignored .env holds Firebase and PostHog keys, and the README has a sample curl command.

const r = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "x-api-key": "sk-ant-…_hAA",
    "anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
    "anthropic-dangerous-direct-browser-access": "true",
  },

VITE_FIREBASE_API_KEY=AIza…52Kv
VITE_POSTHOG_KEY=phc_…yi54

export default defineConfig({ build: { sourcemap: true } });

Claude runs python3 scripts/scan.py vite-spa.

3 secrets exposed

Scanned 10 files (3 build output), 1 commits on 1 refs in 0.1s.

## Exposed (3)

### 1. Anthropic API key in dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js and 1 more place
- **Finding:** Anthropic API key in dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js and 1 more place: hardcoded in a source file; in build output that ships to browsers. First committed 2025-03-02 (6802c6f5), still at HEAD.
- **Evidence:** `sk-ant..._hAA`; dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js:1 (build output, ships to browsers); src/api/chat.ts:5; commit 6802c6f5 2025-03-02: dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js:1 (not pushed); commit 6802c6f5 2025-03-02: src/api/chat.ts:5 (not pushed)
- **Impact:** Readable by anyone who can read the repo or its history and anyone who loads your site or app, in its JavaScript or bundle. Anyone holding it can run paid Claude API calls billed to your account.
- **Fix:**
  1. Revoke it at Anthropic and issue a new one first; nothing else un-leaks it (`python3 /home/dev/.claude/skills/key-leaked/scripts/emergency.py --alert "Anthropic ending _hAA"` prints the steps).
  2. Rebuild and redeploy after removing it from the source; delete old build artifacts and CDN caches.
  3. Read it from an env var in server code (process.env.NAME / os.environ['NAME']).
…
### 2. Resend API key in dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js
- **Finding:** Resend API key in dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js: in build output that ships to browsers. First committed 2025-03-02 (6802c6f5), still at HEAD.
- **Evidence:** `re_...xser`; dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js:1 (build output, ships to browsers); commit 6802c6f5 2025-03-02: dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js:1 (not pushed)
…
### 3. SendGrid API key in dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js.map
- **Finding:** SendGrid API key in dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js.map: in build output that ships to browsers; inside a published source map. First committed 2025-03-02 (6802c6f5), still at HEAD.
- **Evidence:** `SG....QXhw`; dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js.map (source map, original src/legacy/sendgrid.ts:3); commit 6802c6f5 2025-03-02: dist/assets/index-3f9a1c2b.js.map:1 (not pushed)
…
## Check these (1)

- Google Maps API key `AIza...v6RR` at src/components/StoreMap.tsx:4; commit 6802c6f5 2025-03-02: src/components/StoreMap.tsx:4 (not pushed): severity depends on restrictions this scan can't see.

**Publishable by design (info only), 2:** Firebase web config apiKey (.env); PostHog project API key (.env). Not leaks; restrict them in the provider dashboard where supported.

Ignored 1 placeholder, example or encrypted value (cause 22).

@@ src/api/chat.ts @@
 export async function ask(prompt: string) {
-  const r = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", {
+  const r = await fetch("/api/chat", {
     method: "POST",
-    headers: {
-      "x-api-key": "sk-ant-…_hAA",
-      "anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
-      "anthropic-dangerous-direct-browser-access": "true",
-    },
-    body: JSON.stringify({ model: "claude-sonnet-4-5", max_tokens: 512, messages: [{ role: "user", content: prompt }] }),
+    headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ prompt }),
   });
@@ vite.config.ts @@
-export default defineConfig({ build: { sourcemap: true } });
+export default defineConfig({ build: { sourcemap: false } });
@@ .gitignore @@
 node_modules
 .env
+dist

2. Before open-sourcing: a key that was "moved to env" but is still in history

An Express API, already pushed to a private GitHub repo. A while ago the Stripe live key was taken out of config/default.json in a commit called "move stripe key to env". Now the team wants to make the repo public. The current files look fine at a glance.

 {
-  "port": 3000,
-  "stripe": {
-    "secretKey": "sk_live_…xjwU"
-  }
+  "port": 3000
 }

const JWT_SECRET = "fcuttc…qoMG";

# .gitignore
node_modules

Claude runs python3 scripts/scan.py express-api.

4 secrets exposed, 1 at risk, 1 test-mode key

Scanned 9 files, 3 commits on 2 refs in 0.1s.
…
### 3. Stripe live secret key in config/default.json
- **Finding:** Stripe live secret key in config/default.json: in a committed .env or config file; removed from the code but still in git history. First committed 2025-03-02 (b774740a), no longer in the current files.
- **Evidence:** `sk_liv...xjwU`; commit b774740a 2025-03-02: config/default.json:4
- **Impact:** Readable by anyone who can read the repo or its history. Access to your Stripe account within the key's scope: charges, refunds, customer data and payouts.
- **Fix:**
  1. Revoke it at Stripe and issue a new one first; nothing else un-leaks it (`python3 /home/dev/.claude/skills/key-leaked/scripts/emergency.py --alert "Stripe ending xjwU"` prints the steps).
  2. Rotation is the fix. Rewriting history (git filter-repo) is optional cleanup; forks and clones keep the old value.
- Causes: 2, 3. Fingerprint 8dc6b546fec4.
…
### 4. Signing secret (JWT_SECRET) in src/auth.js
- **Finding:** Signing secret (JWT_SECRET) in src/auth.js: hardcoded in a source file; a hardcoded signing secret. First committed 2025-03-02 (0b1bfdcf), still at HEAD.
- **Evidence:** `...qoMG`; src/auth.js:3; commit 0b1bfdcf 2025-03-02: src/auth.js:3
- **Impact:** Readable by anyone who can read the repo or its history. Anyone with it can forge sessions, tokens or webhook events and act as any user.
- **Fix:**
  1. Generate a new signing secret (eg `openssl rand -base64 32`), deploy it, then retire the old one; use your library's key-rotation or dual-key support if it has one. Old sessions or tokens stop working, which is intended.
…
## Test-mode secrets (rotate anyway) (1)

### 6. Stripe test-mode secret key in tests/payments.test.js
- **Finding:** Stripe test-mode secret key in tests/payments.test.js: in docs, a README, a notebook, a test fixture or a seed script. First committed 2025-03-02 (0b1bfdcf), still at HEAD.
- **Evidence:** `sk_tes...lYRB`; tests/payments.test.js:1; commit 0b1bfdcf 2025-03-02: tests/payments.test.js:1
- **Impact:** Test mode only: no real money moves, but it still opens test data and can be abused. Rotate it anyway. Access to your Stripe account within the key's scope: charges, refunds, customer data and payouts.

@@ src/auth.js @@
-const JWT_SECRET = "fcuttc…qoMG";
+const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
@@ src/server.js @@
-console.log("Booting with config", process.env);
+console.log("Booting, SENDGRID_API_KEY set:", Boolean(process.env.SENDGRID_API_KEY));
@@ tests/payments.test.js @@
-const stripe = require("stripe")("sk_test_…lYRB");
+const stripe = require("stripe")(process.env.STRIPE_TEST_SECRET_KEY);
@@ .gitignore @@
 node_modules
+.env

Then git rm --cached .env, so the file stays on your machine but leaves the repo from the next commit on.

3. Emergency: a GitHub secret scanning alert

A Next.js SaaS app, deployed on Vercel. A GitHub secret scanning alert arrives naming an OpenAI API key in src/lib/openai.ts. The developer pastes it into the chat.

import OpenAI from "openai";

export const client = new OpenAI({
  apiKey: "sk-proj-…HvUE",
});

Claude saves the alert to a temporary file and runs python3 scripts/emergency.py --alert-file <tmp-file> --repo next-saas.

OpenAI key reported exposed: rotate it now. Revoke and replace steps below; locations follow after the repo scan

## Rotate now: OpenAI

_From references/runbooks/openai.json, checked 2026-10-13._

**Revoke**

1. Open the API keys page: https://platform.openai.com/settings/organization/api-keys (also linked as https://platform.openai.com/api-keys).
2. Find the leaked key by name and redacted value, then delete it.
3. For an Admin API key, open https://platform.openai.com/settings/organization/admin-keys and delete it there.
4. By API: DELETE /organization/projects/{project_id}/api_keys/{api_key_id} (project keys) or DELETE /organization/admin_api_keys/{key_id} (admin keys), authenticated with an Admin key.
5. Contact OpenAI Support via help.openai.com if you see activity you cannot explain.
6. If your account login may also be exposed, change your password, log out of all sessions and enable MFA.

**Replace**

1. Create a new secret key in the correct project from the API keys page.
2. Set an expiration date on the new project key.
3. Choose permissions in the key-creation dialog: Restricted or Read Only instead of the default All when possible.
4. Use a service-account key for servers and CI rather than a personal key.
5. Store the key in an environment variable or secrets manager on the server only.
…
_Scanning the repo for every location..._

## Result: 1 OpenAI key found in 2 places, first committed 2025-03-01; treat it as public and rotate now

## Where it lives (provider and file from the alert)

1. OpenAI project API key `sk-pro...HvUE` (exposed)
   - src/lib/openai.ts:4
   - commit c2ea274a 2025-03-01: src/lib/openai.ts:4
…
## History cleanup (optional)

Optional, and only after rotating. Rotation is the real fix: forks, clones, CI logs and GitHub's caches keep the old key no matter what you rewrite.
Commands are shown, never run. Needs git-filter-repo 2.47 or later. Merge or close open pull requests first.
```bash
git clone <your-repo-url> repo-clean && cd repo-clean
# write the OLD key into ../replacements.txt yourself, one per line, as: OLD_KEY==>REMOVED
git filter-repo --sensitive-data-removal --replace-text ../replacements.txt
git log --all -p | grep -c 'OLD_KEY_PREFIX'   # verify: expect 0
grep -c '^refs/pull/.*/head$' .git/filter-repo/changed-refs   # pull requests affected
git push --force --mirror origin
```
…
## What else is waiting

- exposed: OpenAI project API key at .env.local:2 (gitignored, but its browser prefix bundles it into client JS)
- exposed: Stripe live secret key at .env.local:1 (gitignored, but its browser prefix bundles it into client JS)
- exposed: Supabase service_role key at components/AdminPanel.tsx:4
- at risk: Code returns the whole environment in an HTTP response at app/api/debug/route.ts:4

@@ src/lib/openai.ts @@
 export const client = new OpenAI({
-  apiKey: "sk-proj-…HvUE",
+  apiKey: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY,
 });

The new key goes into Vercel's environment variables (and your local .env.local, without a NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix), then you redeploy.